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OPINION OF THE COURT           
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
This consolidated appeal consists of two cases in 
which current and former sergeants in the Jersey City Police 
Department accuse defendants Jersey City, the Jersey City 
Police Department, Jersey City Mayor Jerramiah Healy 
(collectively, “Jersey City”), and former Jersey City Police 
Chief Robert Troy of retaliation for exercise of First 
Amendment rights and discrimination, in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey state law.  The District Court 
granted the defendants‟ motions for summary judgment.  For 
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the reasons that follow, we will vacate the judgments of the 
District Court.  
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History  
 
 Plaintiff Valerie Montone was a police officer with the 
Jersey City Police Department (“JCPD”) from January, 1981 
until April, 2010, when she retired as a sergeant.  Plaintiffs 
John Astriab, Clyde Banks, James Buckley, William 
Cullinane, Richard DeStefano, David LaBruno, Ezio Scerbo, 
and John Whalen (the “Astriab plaintiffs”) are present or 
former sergeants in the JCPD.  The plaintiffs‟ claims arise out 
of their failure to be promoted from the rank of sergeant to 
lieutenant during Healy and Troy‟s tenure as mayor and 
police chief, respectively.   
 
 In 2004, Healy ran for mayor in a special election to 
complete the previous mayor‟s unexpired term.  Montone 
supported opposing mayoral candidate Lou Manzo, and used 
saved vacation time to work in a leadership capacity on 
Manzo‟s campaign. 
 
The campaign became particularly heated and 
personal, including allegedly threatening statements.  Healy 
ultimately won the election, and appointed Troy as police 
chief in November, 2004.  Troy served in this capacity until 
his retirement in July, 2006.  
 
 As police chief, Troy had the authority to make 
promotions within the JCPD.  Promotions from sergeant to 
lieutenant in the JCPD are made from the “Eligible/Fail 
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Roster,” informally known as “the promotion list.”  (Montone 
Appendix 450-52 [“M.A”].)  Officers are ranked on the list 
based on their performance on a civil service examination.  
Promotions to lieutenant are generally made starting at the top 
of the list with the most highly-ranked candidate and working 
down the list in numerical order.
1
   
 
 Plaintiffs claim that all promotions from sergeant to 
lieutenant were halted by Healy and Troy during Troy‟s 
tenure as police chief to penalize Montone for her support of 
Mayor Healy‟s opponent.  Each of the plaintiffs had passed 
the civil service examination required to be promoted to the 
rank of lieutenant and were ranked accordingly on the 2003-
2006 promotion list.  From November 2004, when Healy and 
Troy took office, to January 15, 2006, when the promotion 
list expired,
2
 Montone was ranked fifth out of thirty-nine 
eligible officers.  The other plaintiffs were ranked as follows.  
Scerbo was first; LaBruno, second; Whalen, third; Buckley, 
seventh; Cullinane, eighth; Banks, ninth; Astriab, tenth; and 
DeStefano, eleventh.   
 
                                              
1
  Troy points out that, pursuant to the “Rule of Three,” 
as provided for in §§ 4A:4-4.8 and 11A:4-8 of the New Jersey 
Administrative Code, he could have promoted any “one of the 
top three interested eligibles” on the promotion list.  N.J. 
Admin. Code §§ 4A:4-4.8(a)(3) (2012).  
 
2
  The promotion list expired on January 15, 2006.  A 
new list issued following the administration of a subsequent 




 During Troy‟s tenure as police chief, the number of 
officers in the rank of lieutenant decreased from fifty-six to 
thirty, even though an agreement between Jersey City and the 
State of New Jersey Division of Local Government 
authorized sixty-six lieutenants.  In November, 2004, 
February, 2005, and March, 2005, JCPD Operations Division 
Commander Inspector Mark Russ issued memoranda to Troy 
recommending that between five and eleven officers be 
promoted to lieutenant.   
 
 Nonetheless, during Troy‟s term as police chief, not a 
single police officer was promoted to lieutenant.  Promotions 
were made to other ranks within the JCPD, including to the 
ranks of deputy chief, inspector, captain, sergeant, and 
detective.  On December 16, 2006, Healy, then-police chief 
Thomas Comey, and the recently-retired Troy held a meeting 
during which they decided not to promote any of the plaintiffs 
to lieutenant, despite Business Manager Brian O‟Reilly‟s 
urging to do so.  Two days later, on December 18, 2006, 
twelve officers were promoted to lieutenant from the 2006-
2009 promotion list. 
 
Only plaintiff Scerbo was promoted to 




A number of witnesses gave deposition testimony in 
support of plaintiffs‟ theory that all promotions from sergeant 
to lieutenant were halted to retaliate against Montone.  
                                              
3
  According to Jersey City, plaintiffs Astriab, Banks, 
and Whalen did not take the civil service examination 
required to qualify for the 2006-2009 promotion list, and 
LaBruno did not pass the exam and thus was not eligible for a 
promotion after the 2003-2006 list expired.  Plaintiff Whalen 
retired from the JCPD in March 2006.  
7 
 
DeStefano, for example, stated in his deposition that Troy 
told him that he would not be promoted because he was 
behind Montone on the promotion list and “[t]he Mayor will 
not promote her.”  (M.A. 1792.)  In this same conversation, 
Troy noted that DeStefano was “okay with us” because he 
“didn‟t try to hurt us.”  (M.A. 1792.)  DeStefano understood 
this to mean that because he had not “come out against 
[Healy] in the election,” he had not been blacklisted.  (M.A. 
1792.)  Whalen testified to having a substantially similar 
conversation with Troy, who stated that Whalen “didn‟t hurt 
us,” and that Troy was “not making promotions” and “not 
promoting her.”  (M.A. 2265.)  When Whalen protested that 
this was “not fair,” Troy responded by asking Whalen, “Well, 
how would you feel if your best friend‟s wife is sitting at the 
kitchen table crying over threats made by [Montone] against 
her son and nephew?”  (M.A. 2265.)  Scerbo, meanwhile, 
testified that Troy had told him that he “should have no 
problem” getting a promotion because he “was before 
Valerie” on the promotion list.  (M.A. 2094.)   
 
Montone also points to evidence of Healy and Troy 
promoting their political supporters, and of Jersey City‟s 
history of political patronage.  Healy testified, for example, 
that he had spoken to Troy about both Kevin Guy and Patricia 
Cassidy, whose relatives were political supporters of Healy 
and both of whom were ultimately promoted to sergeant.  
 
Jersey City argues that no lieutenant promotions were 
made “due to budgetary concerns at the Police Department 
and a desire to improve the department‟s organizational 
structure to permit more supervisory police officers on 
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patrol.”  (Jersey City‟s M. Br. 6.)4  Jersey City emphasizes 
that “[t]here was no plan to stop promotions in order to avoid 
promoting [Montone].”  (Jersey City‟s M. Br. at 7.)  Troy 
further contends that “there was not a shortage of 
Lieutenants,” (Troy‟s M. Br. 4), and that political opponents 
of Healy, such as Edwin Gillan and Roberto Atkinson, were 
promoted to sergeant despite being “vocal supporters of Louis 
Manzo in the 2004 Election.”  (Troy‟s M. Br. 7.)  
 
Montone contends that in addition to suffering 
retaliation for her political activities, she also incurred 
retaliation because of her involvement in numerous sexual 
harassment investigations and complaints against the JCPD, 
dating back to 1993 and continuing until her retirement in 
2010.  Most notably, Montone reported to Captain Anthony 
D‟Aiuto in 2002 that another officer, Marisa Johnston, was 
being sexually harassed by then-lieutenant Troy.   
 
In addition to not being promoted, Montone alleges 
that the retaliation against her included other conduct, such as 
Troy spreading rumors that Montone was the individual 
responsible for distributing embarrassing photographs of the 
mayor at his daughter‟s wedding, and that Montone “had 
threatened the mayor‟s son.”  (M.A. 467.)  Montone also 
claims that political retaliation was the motive behind an 
internal JCPD investigation into whether she was sleeping on 
the job, and her subsequent reassignment to the less desirable 
evening tour.  Captain Kevin Oras testified in support of 
Montone‟s theory, stating that Troy told him that “[a]s long as 
                                              
 
4
  The defendants filed separate briefs in the Montone 
and Astriab matters; the briefs are designated by “M” and 
“A,” respectively.  
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I'm Chief, that cow c**t will never get promoted to 
lieutenant” and “will never go on the day tour.”  (M.A. 460.)   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
On December 13, 2005, Montone filed suit against 
Jersey City and Troy in the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
asserting ten causes of action: (1) gender discrimination in 
employment, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (“NJLAD”); (2) employment retaliation, also 
in violation of the NJLAD; (3) retaliation for protected 
conduct, in violation of the New Jersey Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act; (4) retaliation for protected First 
Amendment speech, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) 
retaliation for political affiliation protected by the First 
Amendment, also in violation of § 1983; (6) disparate 
treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and § 
1983; (7) retaliation for speech protected by the New Jersey 
Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act; (8) 
retaliation for political affiliation protected by the New Jersey 
Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act; (9) sexual 
harassment, in violation of the NJLAD; and (10) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  See Montone v. City of Jersey 
City, No. 06-280 (SRC)(MAS), 2011 WL 2559514, at *1 
(D.N.J. June 27, 2011).  In August, 2005, DeStefano, 
Cullinane, Whalen, Scerbo, Astriab, and Banks gave 
Certifications in support of Montone‟s claims against the 
defendants.  The defendants removed the action to federal 
court in January, 2006.  In August, 2006, the Astriab 
plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, asserting claims for (1) gender 
discrimination and (2) retaliation in violation of the NJLAD, 
as well as claims pursuant to § 1983 for (3) retaliation related 
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to Montone‟s political affiliation in violation of the First 
Amendment and (4) disparate treatment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Astriab v. City of Jersey City, 
No. 06-3790 (SRC)(MAS), 2011 WL 5080353, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 25, 2011). 
 
On June 27, 2011, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for Jersey City and Troy on Montone‟s free speech 
and political affiliation claims.  As to the political retaliation 
claim, the District Court found that Montone had failed to 
muster sufficient evidence of a causal relationship between 
Montone‟s support of Healy‟s opponent and the failure to be 
promoted to lieutenant.  See Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at 
*11.  The District Court reached this same conclusion with 
regard to Montone‟s other political retaliation claims, such as 
her claim that she was reassigned to the evening tour because 
of her support of Manzo.  See id. at *6.  As to Montone‟s 
claim that she suffered retaliation for complaining about 
gender discrimination in the operation of the JCPD, the 
District Court determined that Montone‟s complaints were 
not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.  Having 
granted summary judgment to the defendants on the First 
Amendment claims in Counts Four and Five, and Montone 
having voluntarily withdrawn her Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claim, id. at *10 n.7, the District Court 
“exercise[d] its discretion not to retain supplemental 
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims,” and 
remanded the case to the Superior Court of New Jersey.  Id. at 
*10-11. 
 
On August 16, 2011, the District Court similarly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Jersey City and Troy 
on the Astriab plaintiffs‟ claims brought under § 1983 for 
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retaliation and denial of equal protection in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts Three and Four).  
See Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at *1.  With regard to the 
political retaliation claim, the District Court declined to 
address the question of whether the Astriab plaintiffs have 
standing to bring a cause of action for First Amendment 
retaliation based upon Montone‟s allegedly protected 
conduct, reasoning that it was unnecessary to do so because 
“Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] otherwise failed to defeat” the defendants‟ 
summary judgment motions.  Id. at *2.  Specifically, the 
District Court found that “Plaintiffs have failed to point to 
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could decide in 
their favor on the question of whether Montone‟s political 
conduct was a motivating factor in the decision not to 
promote her or them.”5  Id. at *4.  Declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, 





 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343, and 1443, and we have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We employ a de novo standard of 
review to grants of summary judgment, “applying the same 
standard as the District Court.”  Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 
F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  “This requires that we view the 
                                              
 
5
  The Astriab plaintiffs appeal only the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment on Count Three, and thus 
we need not address the District Court‟s decision on their 




underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”  
Id.  Summary judgment shall be granted where no genuine 
dispute exists as to any material fact, and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
We will address the District Court‟s decisions on Montone‟s 
claims and the derivative claims asserted by the Astriab 
plaintiffs separately. 
 
A. Montone‟s Claims  
 
 Montone appeals the District Court‟s grant of 
summary judgment on her claims under § 1983 for retaliation 
for political affiliation and speech, in violation of the First 




 Our jurisprudence governing political association 
retaliation claims under the First Amendment has its origins 
in the Supreme Court‟s “trilogy” of “political patronage 
cases.”  Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 663 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti 
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990)).  From these cases and their progeny, 
“we have derived a three-part test to establish a claim of 
discrimination based on political patronage in violation of the 
First Amendment.”  Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 
F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2007).  First, the plaintiff must 
establish that “she was employed at a public agency in a 
position that does not require political affiliation.”  Id.  
Second, the plaintiff must show that she engaged in conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.  Id.  And finally, the 
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plaintiff must prove that the constitutionally-protected 
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse 
employment action.  Id.   
 
 The first two prongs of the test for political affiliation 
retaliation are not in dispute here.  Montone was employed as 
an officer with the JCPD, a position where political affiliation 
is not “an appropriate requirement for the effective 
performance of the public office involved.”  Branti, 445 U.S. 
at 518; see also Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (“Limiting patronage 
dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient to achieve 
this governmental end.  Nonpolicymaking individuals usually 
have only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a 
position to thwart the goals of the in-party.”).  Similarly, 
Montone‟s political support of Manzo was constitutionally 
protected conduct.  See Branti, 445 U.S. at 519 (“[I]t is 
manifest that . . . continued employment . . . cannot properly 
be conditioned upon . . . allegiance to the political party in 
control . . . .”); Galli, 490 F.3d at 272 (“[A] plaintiff can meet 
the second prong of a prima facie political discrimination 
claim if she suffers because of active support for a losing 
candidate . . . .”). 
 
 Accordingly, the matter in dispute here concerns the 
third prong of the test: whether Montone‟s political support of 
Manzo “was a substantial or motivating factor” in the 
decision to not promote her from sergeant to lieutenant.  
Galli, 490 F.3d at 271.  The District Court focused 
specifically on this prong of the test, ultimately finding that 
Montone “offered no evidence from which a reasonable trier 
of fact could conclude that [her] political affiliation or other 
protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in the 
decision not to promote [her].”  Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, 
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at *6.  We find that in so holding the District Court 
misapplied the summary judgment standard. 
 
 The District Court first erred by drawing unfavorable 
inferences against Montone, the non-movant.  The District 
Court concluded, for example, that when Troy told DeStefano 
that he was “okay” because DeStefano “didn‟t try to hurt us,” 
(M.A. 1792),
 “[n]o reasonable trier of fact could infer from 
the DeStefano testimony that Troy was speaking about 
political affiliation or protected conduct.”6  Montone, 2011 
WL 2559514, at *5.
 
  The District Court, relying on Whalen‟s 
testimony, determined that “hurt” in this context referred to 
Montone “making threats against someone‟s son and nephew, 
which upset that person‟s wife.”  Id.  Accordingly, the 
District Court found that “the decision not to promote 
Plaintiff was based on personal animus, not retaliation for 
political affiliation or activities or other protected conduct,” 
and that “the „you didn‟t hurt us‟ evidence does not raise any 
                                              
6
  Troy and Jersey City argued before the District 
Court that such statements were inadmissible hearsay.  The 
District Court did not rule on the issue because it concluded 
that this evidence, “even if admitted, fails to raise factual 
disputes sufficient to defeat the motions for summary 
judgment . . . .”  Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at *4 n.3.   We 
hold that these statements made by Troy are not hearsay 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), and thus the 
District Court properly considered the statements in resolving 
the summary judgment motions.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(A) (defining as “not hearsay” a statement that is 
“offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by the 




factual dispute about the motivating factor element.”  Id.  
This conclusion, however, directly contradicts DeStefano‟s 
own understanding of the conversation.  According to his 
deposition testimony, DeStefano understood Troy to mean 
that he, DeStefano, was “okay” precisely because he had not 
“come out against [Healy] in the election.”  (M.A. 1792.)  
DeStefano‟s understanding is consistent with Montone‟s 
claim that Troy set out to block her promotion to lieutenant 
because she had sought to prevent Healy‟s election. 
 
Troy attacks DeStefano‟s credibility by noting that his 
statement was not contained in DeStefano‟s original 
Certification obtained by Montone‟s counsel in August, 2005, 
and that DeStefano is a plaintiff in the Astriab litigation, a 
case “whose success . . . is entirely dependent on Montone‟s 
success herein . . . .”  (Troy‟s M. Br. 25.) Furthermore, Troy 
notes that DeStefano‟s testimony could be interpreted 
differently – at one point, DeStefano testified to rumors 
concerning Montone stepping on the foot and spitting in the 
face of Healy‟s spouse, for example.  (See M.S.A. 383.)  Troy 
suggests that he could have been referring to this incident 
when he discussed how Montone had “hurt us.”  (M.A. 1792.)  
While Troy may ultimately prevail on this point, “[i]n 
considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court 
may not make credibility determinations or engage in any 
weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party‟s 
evidence „is to be believed[,] and all justifiable inferences are 
to be drawn in his favor.‟”  Marino v. Indus. Crafting Co., 
358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).  On this issue, 
the District Court appears to have made credibility 
determinations, weighed the evidence against Montone, and 
failed to draw all justifiable inferences in her favor.  Stated 
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otherwise, it would not be unreasonable to construe Troy‟s 
“you didn‟t hurt us” statement as referring to Montone‟s 
opposition to Healy.  
 
 Furthermore, the District Court, despite appearing to 
have accepted Montone‟s argument that Jersey City and 
Troy‟s justifications for not promoting any lieutenants were 
pretextual, erred in concluding that a jury could not draw 
from that fact an inference that the non-promotion of 
Montone was intended to retaliate for her political activity.  
Troy contended that promotions to lieutenant were suspended 
for legitimate budgetary and operational reasons.  But the 
District Court observed:   
 
Examining Plaintiff's evidence as 
a whole, and making every 
reasonable inference in favor of 
Plaintiff, as the nonmovant, a 
reasonable trier of fact, hearing 
Plaintiff's evidence, could easily 
find that Chief Troy bore ill will 
toward Plaintiff and was 
determined not to promote her to 
Lieutenant.  Moreover, there is 
evidence which, if credited by the 
trier of fact, supports the inference 
that he bore such ill will toward 
Plaintiff that he stopped all 
promotions to Lieutenant during 
his tenure as Chief, even though 
this decision may have been a 
poor one from the perspective of 
17 
 
the organizational needs of the 
Police Department.  
 
Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at *6.  The District Court 
determined, however, that “[a]t best, this constitutes evidence 
of retaliation.  None of this . . . is probative of the motive for 
the retaliation.”  Id.   
 
 It is by now axiomatic that a plaintiff in an 
employment retaliation case may avoid summary judgment 
by offering evidence that discredits the reasons articulated by 
the defense for the adverse employment action.  See, e.g., 
Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1997).  By 
presenting evidence that casts doubt on Troy‟s articulated 
rationale for suspending all promotions to the lieutenant 
position, Montone is entitled to have the trier-of-fact decide 
whether it was a general dislike of her that motivated Troy, or 
whether it was personal animosity that sprung from 
Montone‟s vocal opposition to the candidacy of Troy‟s 
patron.  Indeed, in Stephens, we held that summary judgment 
was not appropriate where plaintiffs “made a sufficient 
showing to discredit [defendant‟s] proffered reasons for not 
promoting from the lieutenants lists and thus [were] entitled 
to have a fact finder determine whether their political 
affiliation or non-support was a substantial or motivating 
cause of the failure to promote.”  122 F.3d at 183.  The 
District Court here similarly agreed with Montone that Jersey 
City and Troy‟s proffered reasons were pretextual, but then 
granted summary judgment to the defendants rather than 
allowing a fact finder to determine whether Montone‟s 
political activities during the election were the real reason 




 The District Court‟s dismissal of evidence of a pattern 
of political patronage in Jersey City was also improper.  See 
Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at *3 (“Evidence that, during 
Mayor Healy‟s administration, other people have gotten jobs 
or promotions in Jersey City for political reasons may have 
some minimal probative value as background, but it is clearly 
insufficient by itself to support an inference that Plaintiff was 
retaliated against.”)  As we held in Goodman, “a history of 
improper promotion practices using sponsorship as a factor” 
may, when presented with other facts, prove to be “sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find 
that political affiliation was a substantial factor in the decision 
not to promote . . . .”  Id. at 674.  In this case, there are other 
facts that, when combined with evidence of political 
patronage, suffice to defeat summary judgment.  In particular, 
there is the evidence of recommendations that the number of 
lieutenants on the police force be increased as well as 
evidence that there were promotions to every other rank but 
lieutenant during Troy‟s tenure as Police Chief that, when 
considered in combination with a history of political 
patronage, supports a reasonable inference that Montone was 
not promoted in retaliation for her political activity. 
 
 The District Court also erred in giving substantial 
weight to evidence that Troy promoted at least one of 
candidate Manzo‟s supporters, Edwin Gillan.  Montone, 2011 
WL 2559514, at *6 n.6.  While this may be relevant evidence 
for the fact finder to consider when ultimately determining if 
Montone was in fact retaliated against based on her political 
activity, it does not preclude a jury from finding that 
Montone‟s support for Manzo was the motivating factor in 
not receiving a promotion.  At the summary judgment stage, 
Montone need only “„make a showing sufficient to establish 
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the existence of [the] element[s] essential to [her] case . . . .‟”  
Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986)).  Her showing in this case is not overcome by the fact 
that one supporter of Healy‟s opponent was promoted, 
especially given the evidence of how active Montone was in 
supporting Manzo.  The three-prong test for retaliation for 
political affiliation does not require that Montone prove that 
every other supporter of Healy‟s opponent also suffered 
retaliation.  
 
In summary, the District Court misapplied the 
summary judgment standard by weighing evidence and 
drawing inferences against Montone, the non-movant, even 
after acknowledging that she presented sufficient evidence to 
show that the reasons proffered by Jersey City and Troy for 
her non-promotion may have been pretextual.  The District 
Court also improperly dismissed evidence of a culture of 
political patronage in Jersey City, and erred in granting 
summary judgment based upon evidence of the promotion of 
another Manzo supporter.  Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at *6 
n.6.  Accordingly, we vacate the District Court‟s grant of 
summary judgment for the defendants on the political 




 We now turn to Count Four: whether Montone was 
retaliated against for speech protected under the First 
Amendment.  We analyze Montone‟s claim, arising as it does 
in the public employment context, under a three-part test:  (1) 
was the plaintiff speaking as a citizen rather than as a public 
employee discharging her employment duties; (2) did the 
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plaintiff‟s statements address a matter of  public concern as 
opposed to a personal interest; and (3) did the plaintiff‟s 
employer have “„an adequate justification for treating the 
employee differently from any other member of the general 
public‟ as a result of the statement [the employee] made.”  
Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009), 
(quoting Garretti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).   
 
The District Court held that Montone‟s free speech 
claim failed the second part of the test – that the speech at 
issue involve a matter of public concern, observing that she 
“neither precisely identifies the speech that she contends was 
on matters of public concern, nor makes any case at all that 
such speech was on matters of public concern.”  Id.  Quoting 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the District Court 
then granted summary judgment to Jersey City and Troy on 
this claim because 
 
“when a public employee speaks 
not as a citizen upon matters of 
public concern, but instead as an 
employee upon matters of only 
personal interest, absent the most 
unusual circumstances, a federal 
court is not the appropriate forum 
in which to review the wisdom of 
a personnel decision taken by a 
public agency allegedly in 
reaction to the employee‟s 
behavior.”  
 




 Montone‟s allegedly protected speech concerns in 
large measure her complaints of gender inequality in the 
workplace dating back to the 1990s, when she successfully 
brought a sexual harassment lawsuit.  Montone continued to 
complain of sexual harassment even after that lawsuit was 
concluded.  In 2003, she informed a captain in the JCPD that 
Troy, who was then a lieutenant, was sexually harassing 
Officer Marisa Johnston.  
 
We addressed the question of whether a public 
employee‟s speech regarding sexual harassment can 
constitute protected speech in Azzaro v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
110 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc), where the plaintiff, a 
former Allegheny County employee, was fired after reporting 
that she was sexually harassed by an assistant to the County 
Commissioner.  Id. at 970.  The plaintiff subsequently sued 
the County and two County employees, alleging, inter alia, 
retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment, in 
violation of § 1983.  Id. at 975.  Applying the analytical 
framework laid out by the Supreme Court in Connick, we 
noted that the key to the “public concern” inquiry is “whether 
expression of the kind at issue is of value to the process of 
self-governance.”  Id. at 977.  We further explained that “the 
issue is whether it is important to the process of self-
governance that communications on this topic, in this form 
and in this context, take place.”  Id.  We observed that 
“[r]acial discrimination in the assignment of school personnel 
. . . was characterized by the Connick Court as „a matter 
inherently of public concern.‟”  Id. (quoting Connick, 461 
U.S. at 148 n.8).  Extending this reasoning, we noted that 
gender discrimination, “when practiced by those exercising 
authority in the name of a public official, is as much a matter 
of public concern as racial discrimination practiced under 
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similar circumstances.”  Id. at 978.  We also noted, however, 
that not “all public employee complaints about sexual 
harassment are matters of public concern,” and that 
examination of “all of the surrounding circumstances” is 
required when making such a determination.  Id. at 980.   
 
A circumstance that weighed in favor of finding that 
the communication in Azzaro involved a matter of public 
concern was that the alleged harassment “brought to light 
actual wrongdoing on the part of one exercising public 
authority that would be relevant to the electorate‟s evaluation 
of the performance of the office of an elected official.”  Id. at 
978.  While Montone‟s allegations of gender discrimination 
and harassment do not directly concern an elected official, as 
even Johnston‟s sexual harassment complaint against Troy 
occurred prior to Healy‟s election and appointment of Troy as 
chief, the fact that Montone‟s speech would not directly help 
the public evaluate an elected official‟s performance is not 
dispositive.    
 
For example, in Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258 
(4th Cir. 2007), the plaintiff, a former police officer, sued the 
Town of Southern Pines, the police department, and several 
town employees, alleging, inter alia, First Amendment 
retaliation when she was fired after filing several complaints 
of sexual harassment with the police chief, as well as a gender 
discrimination and retaliation charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.  Id. at 262-64.  In 
reviewing the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment for 
the defendants, the Fourth Circuit noted that, while “not every 
statement about sexual discrimination involves a matter of 
public concern, our cases have provided little concrete 
guidance on the question of when such a complaint amounts 
23 
 
to an issue of public concern.”  Id. at 269.  The Campbell 
Court explained that this was perfectly acceptable:  
 
We see no reason to try to 
articulate any sort of bright-line 
rule in this case, nor are we 
certain that a bright-line rule 
would be consistent with the 
Supreme Court's directive that we 
engage in a case-and fact-specific 
inquiry to determine “[w]hether 
an employee's speech addresses a 
matter of public concern,” by 
considering “the content, form, 
and context of a given statement, 
as revealed by the whole record.”  
 
Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).  The Fourth 
Circuit noted that “[t]o conclude, as the defendants would 
have us do, that a personal complaint about discrimination 
affecting only the complaining employee can never amount to 
an issue of public concern could improperly limit the range of 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
 
Shifting to the facts in that matter, the Campbell Court 
noted that the plaintiff “complained about multiple instances 
of inappropriate conduct directed towards her,” and wrote a 
letter to the police chief where she “also included complaints 
about inappropriate conduct directed towards other females.”  
Id.  As that case also concerned a grant of summary judgment 
to defendants, the Fourth Circuit “view[ed] the complaints in 
the light most favorable to [the plaintiff],” and concluded that 
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her “complaints about sexual discrimination do amount to 
matters of public concern.”  Id.  
 
 We find Campbell’s reasoning persuasive.  There are 
at least three separate instances of alleged sexual harassment 
here,
7
 and the inappropriate conduct was not directed solely at 
Montone.  Although no elected figure is involved, these facts 
otherwise present a stronger argument that Montone‟s speech 
was related to a matter of public concern than was presented 
in Azzaro, which referred only to a single incident.  See 110 
F.3d at 980 (“We do believe, however, that under all of the 
surrounding circumstances, Azzaro's reports address a matter 
of public concern even though they referred to a single 
incident.”).  Accordingly, we hold that Montone was engaged 
in protected activity as her speech involved a matter of public 
concern. 
 
Once the public concern “threshold” is met, “we must 
balance between the interest of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest 
of the [public employer], in promoting efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employee.‟”  Miller v. 
Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Pickering v. Bd. Of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  We 
find, as we did in Azzaro, that “[s]triking the appropriate 
balance in this case is not difficult,” as “those governmental 
                                              
7
  The three instances are the sexual harassment 
lawsuit from the 1990s, Montone‟s complaint against Carter 
from 2002-2003, and Montone‟s escalation of Johnston‟s 
sexual harassment claim against Troy from 2002.  See 




interests are negligible here.”  110 F.3d at 980.  As in Azzaro, 
“[w]e fail to see how” Montone‟s speech “could have posed 
any threats to the government‟s interest in efficiency or 
effectiveness,” especially in those instances when she used 
internal mechanisms to voice her grievances.  Id. (finding that 
defendant‟s affirmative recognition that “complaints about 
sexual harassment were important to its ability to serve the 
public . . . [constituted] an acknowledgement . . . that 
communications in the manner and place of [plaintiff‟s] do 
not pose an undue threat of disruption”).  Accordingly, we 
hold that Montone has demonstrated that her interest in the 
speech at issue outweighs Jersey City‟s interest in efficiency. 
  
While not every one of Montone‟s statements 
addressed a matter of public concern,
8
 and while Montone 
will still have to demonstrate at trial that she was acting as a 
citizen and not as a police officer when she engaged in what 
she claims to be protected conduct, and that her speech was a 
substantial or motivating factor in her non-promotion, the 
District Court erroneously granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on Montone‟s free speech claim by concluding 
that her gender discrimination complaints did not involve 
matters of public concern.  Accordingly, we vacate the grant 
of summary judgment on the free speech claim. 
 
B. The Astriab Plaintiffs‟ Claims  
 
                                              
8
  For example, Montone‟s refusal to pay Troy money 
from the settlement of her first lawsuit does not appear to be a 
matter of public concern.  See Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, 




 The Astriab plaintiffs appeal only the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment on their claim pursuant to § 1983 
for retaliation for Montone‟s political affiliation in violation 
of the First Amendment (Count Three).  Before addressing 
whether the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment, we must first consider whether the Astriab 
plaintiffs have standing to bring an action for retaliation for 
political affiliation based on the defendants‟ alleged 
deprivation of Montone’s First Amendment rights.9  See 
AT&T Commc’ns of N.J., Inc. v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 270 F.3d 
162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 
1.   
 
 “A party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish 
that he has standing to sue within the meaning of Article III, 
section two of the Constitution, which limits the courts to 
hearing actual cases or controversies.”  Anjelino v. New York 
Times, 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 1999).  “[T]he irreducible 
constitutional minimum” of standing requires a party to set 
forth specific facts indicating the existence of an actual or 
imminent injury that is causally connected to the defendant‟s 
challenged action and is “„likely‟” to be “„redressed by a 
favorable decision.‟”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
                                              
 
9
  The Supreme Court has instructed courts of appeals 
to answer the jurisdictional question of standing before 
“proceeding to an easily-resolved merits question despite 
jurisdictional objections,” in consideration of the “importance 
of the standing doctrine” to preserving separation of powers.  
Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 
300 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998)). 
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U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. En. Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).  “Courts assess whether 
a party has established injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability by considering whether the alleged injury falls 
within the „zone of interests‟ that the statute or constitutional 
provision at issue was designed to protect; whether the 
complaint raises concrete questions, rather than abstract ones 
that are better suited to resolution by the legislative and 
executive branches; and whether the plaintiff is asserting his 
own legal rights and interests, as opposed to those of third 
parties.”  Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 88.   
 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that “when the 
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or 
inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is 
ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.”  Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 562 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Astriab plaintiffs‟ suit presents one such 
difficult case.  No other court of appeals has, to our 
knowledge, addressed the question presented by this case: 
whether a plaintiff has standing to bring an action for First 
Amendment political affiliation retaliation pursuant to § 1983 
based on the defendant‟s alleged deprivation of another‟s 
First Amendment rights.   
 
 The defendants argue that the Astriab plaintiffs do not 
have standing because they failed to allege an actual injury 
and cannot satisfy their burden with respect to the causation 
requirement of Article III standing.  According to Jersey City, 
“[t]he plaintiffs have not produced evidence of an inherent 
right to a promotion,” or shown that absent the illegal conduct 
against Montone “any of them was certain or even likely to 
have been promoted.”  (Jersey City‟s A. Br. 48.)  Jersey City 
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further argues that the plaintiffs have not established the 
alleged injury‟s nexus to the defendants‟ purported violation 
of Montone‟s First Amendment rights, reasoning that 
“[a]llegations of discrimination concerning Montone, even if 
true, could have no bearing upon employment decisions made 
in regard to [the] plaintiffs.”  (Jersey City‟s A. Br. 48.)  Troy, 
for his part, distinguishes between the plaintiffs ranked above 
and below Montone, concluding that the plaintiffs ranked 
above Montone “could have been promoted regardless of any 
. . . discrimination” against her, while those ranked below did 
not suffer an actual injury “because there is no guarantee 
promotions would have continued beyond [Montone‟s 
promotion] and that they would have ever been promoted.”  
(Troy‟s A. Br. 47, 51.)  
 
 The Astriab plaintiffs argue to the contrary that they 
have sufficiently alleged an actual injury, namely, their non-
promotion.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs aver that they have 
satisfied the causation requirement by alleging specific facts 
concerning how Montone‟s political activities during the 
2004 mayoral campaign resulted in the defendants refusing to 
promote Montone, and any other eligible sergeant, during 
Troy‟s tenure as police chief.  
 
 The Astriab plaintiffs assert that their position is 
supported by our decision in Anjelino.  We agree.  In 
Anjelino, male and female employees of the New York Times 
Company (the “Times”) mailroom sued the Times and other 
defendants for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  200 F.3d at 78.  The female 
employees alleged that they were not promoted from the 
“priority list,” which determined whether and how often an 
employee would receive mailroom shifts, due to their gender.  
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Id. at 80.  The male employees similarly brought claims under 
Title VII, alleging, inter alia, that “they suffered pecuniary 
injury because they were on the priority list among women, 
who were not hired due to sex discrimination because hiring 
stopped when the women‟s names were reached.”  Id. at 89.  
The district court dismissed the male employees‟ claims, 
finding that they lacked standing to sue under Title VII.  Id. at 
85.  
 
 We reversed, holding that “„indirect‟ victims of sex-
based discrimination have standing to sue under Title VII if 
they allege colorable claims of injury-in-fact that are fairly 
traceable to acts or omissions by defendants that are unlawful 
under the statute,” and therefore the male employees had 
standing even though the defendants‟ discriminatory actions 
were directed at the female employees.   Id. at 92.  In so 
holding, we emphasized: “That the injury at issue is 
characterized as indirect is immaterial, as long as it is 
traceable to the defendant‟s unlawful acts or omissions.”  Id.  
We then concluded that the male employees satisfied Article 
III‟s injury-in-fact requirement because “allegations that sex 
discrimination adversely affected [plaintiffs] being hired as 
extras, as well as their seniority on the priority list, 
demonstrate actual injury,” and, furthermore, the male 
employees pled sufficient “specific facts” to make the 
requisite showing of causation.  Id.  
 
 More recently, the Supreme Court similarly held that 
an individual has standing to sue for employment retaliation 
pursuant to Title VII, relying on the protected conduct of 
another individual.  In Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 
S.Ct. 863 (2011), plaintiff Thompson, an employee of North 
American Stainless (NAS), sued NAS for unlawful retaliation 
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under Title VII when he was fired after his fiancée, also an 
NAS employee, filed a sex discrimination charge against 
NAS with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  
Id. at 867.  In addressing the question of whether Thompson 
had standing to sue, the Court found that “Thompson‟s claim 
undoubtedly meets [the] requirements” of Article III standing.  
Id. at 869. 
 
 While Anjelino and Thompson involved questions of 
standing in the context of claims under Title VII, we find the 
reasoning in those cases persuasive.  Indeed, we have 
similarly relied upon Title VII jurisprudence in resolving 
questions of first impression related to § 1983 claims because 
of the “consonance” of the “policy considerations” underlying 
each statute.  Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning of Anjelino and 
Thompson in holding that a party has standing to bring an 
action for First Amendment political affiliation retaliation 
pursuant to § 1983, even where, as here, the alleged 
retaliation was directed towards another individual, provided 
the party can satisfy “[t]he irreducible constitutional 
minimum” of Article III standing.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
 
 The three requirements of Article III standing are 
satisfied here.  The plaintiffs allege that each passed the civil 
service examination as required to be promoted to the rank of 
lieutenant, were ranked on the promotion list, and nonetheless 
were not promoted to lieutenant during Troy‟s tenure.  The 
plaintiffs also allege that during Troy‟s term as police chief 
promotions were made in all other ranks in the JCPD except 
lieutenant, even though lieutenant promotions were 
authorized and necessary.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege 
that the defendants consciously chose not to promote 
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Montone or any other sergeant due to Montone‟s involvement 
in the 2004 mayoral election, to the effect that the Astriab 
plaintiffs were not promoted or, at the very least, were 
prevented from moving up in numerical rank on the 
promotion list.  Thus, as in Anjelino, the Astriab plaintiffs‟ 
allegations that the defendants‟ illegal political retaliation 
“adversely affected [plaintiffs] being [promoted], as well as 
their seniority on the priority list, demonstrate actual injury.”  
Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 92; see also Grizzell v. City of 
Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 718 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(finding plaintiff police officers‟ “alleged injury to be 
sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy 
constitutional requirements” where plaintiffs alleged that they 
were not promoted or incurred a delay in being promoted to 
sergeant as a result of the defendants‟ use of a 1999, rather 
than 2001, promotion list). 
 
 The Astriab plaintiffs have also satisfied their burden 
with respect to the causation element.  The plaintiffs allege 
that Healy and Troy did not promote Montone following her 
involvement in the 2004 mayoral campaign, specifically 
noting that Troy informed several sergeants that he was “not 
making any lieutenants,” “not promoting [Montone]” because 
she “hurt us,” and therefore no sergeants would be promoted 
to lieutenant.  (Astriab Appendix 362-63, 374, 387 [“A.A.”].)  
The plaintiffs also aver that none of the Astriab plaintiffs was 
promoted to the rank of lieutenant during Troy‟s tenure as 
police chief, even though all were eligible for promotions, 
there was a shortage of lieutenants in the JCPD, Troy was 
authorized to fill vacant lieutenant positions, and promotions 




 The final Article III standing requirement – 
redressability – is also satisfied.   As we have recognized, 
“§ 1983 has always provided both legal and equitable relief.”  
Squires, 54 F.3d at 172.  Available forms of equitable relief 
include back pay and “retroactive seniority.”  Gurmankin v. 
Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980).  Additionally, 
front pay is recoverable, and, in some circumstances, 
instatement is also an appropriate remedy.  Walsdorf v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs for the E. Jefferson Levee Dist., 857 F.2d 1047, 
1054 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., 
777 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (6th Cir. 1985); Todaro v. Cnty. of 
Union, 920 A.2d 1243, 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 
19, 2007) (holding that instatement and the “rightful place” 
remedy, by which the plaintiff is placed in the next 
comparable job opening, are both appropriate remedies 
“where a public employee has been denied appointment to a 
classified civil service position solely on the basis of political 
affiliation,” in violation of § 1983).  Thus, there exists an 
“appropriate remedy that we can grant” the Astriab plaintiffs, 
AT&T, 270 F.3d at 171, and the plaintiffs have made the 
requisite showing that it is “„likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that [their] injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.‟”  Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).  
 
 Finally, we turn to the prudential standing requirement 
that a plaintiff‟s asserted interest falls within the “zone of 
interests” that the constitutional guarantee at issue was 
designed to protect.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).  The Supreme Court “ha[s] described 
the „zone of interests‟ test as denying a right of review if the 
plaintiff‟s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent 
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with the purposes implicit in the statute [or constitutional 
guarantee in question] that it cannot reasonably be assumed” 
suit was intended to be permitted.  Thompson, 131 S.Ct. at 
870 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 153 (1970).  
 
 The Astriab plaintiffs assert that, as a result of the 
defendants‟ retaliation against Montone for her protected 
political conduct, they did not receive a promotion for which 
they were eligible, in contravention of the First Amendment 
and § 1983.  It is axiomatic that “political belief and 
association constitute the core of those activities protected by 
the First Amendment.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356.  In Robertson 
v. Fiore, 62 F.3d 596 (3d Cir. 1995), we acknowledged the 
First Amendment‟s protections for public employees in 
positions not requiring political affiliation, and explained the 
important policy considerations motivating this Constitutional 
guarantee:  
 
Without the protection afforded 
by the Constitution, employees 
might forgo the expression of 
their political beliefs or artificially 
change their political association 
to avoid displeasing their 
supervisors. Such coercion, 
whether direct or indirect, is 
incongruent with a free political 
marketplace. 
 




 That the retaliatory conduct at issue here was not 
directed at the Astriab plaintiffs is not dispositive, because the 
First Amendment concerns implicated by political affiliation 
retaliation are the same whether a plaintiff is the “direct” or 
“indirect” victim of illegal political retaliation.  See 
Robertson, 62 F.3d at 600.  An employee might be equally 
dissuaded from engaging in protected political activity where 
it is his fellow workers who experience retaliation for that 
employee having engaged in the “core” First Amendment 
activities of free “political belief and association.”  Elrod, 427 
U.S. at 357.  The Astriab plaintiffs‟ interest in being 
promoted in a public agency employment position free from 
the influences of political association thus falls within the 
“zone of interests” protected by the First Amendment.  
 
 Because the Astriab plaintiffs have pled specific facts 
demonstrating the existence of all three Article III standing 
requirements, and because the plaintiffs‟ asserted interest falls 
within the “zone of interests” protected by the First 
Amendment, we hold that they have standing to pursue a 
claim pursuant to § 1983 for retaliation for political affiliation 
in violation of the First Amendment, even though the 
underlying protected conduct is that of Montone, not of the 




 We turn next to the question of whether the District 
Court erroneously granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on the Astriab plaintiffs‟ claim.  
 
 As discussed in Part II(A)(1) supra, a plaintiff must 
satisfy a three-part test to establish a claim for First 
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Amendment political affiliation retaliation.  See Galli, 490 
F.3d at 271.  As in the Montone suit, the first two prongs of 
the test are not in dispute here.  Each of the Astriab plaintiffs 
was employed as an officer with the JCPD, a position where 
political affiliation is not “an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the public office involved.”  Branti, 
445 U.S. at 518.  Furthermore, as discussed in Part II(B)(i) 
supra, the Astriab plaintiffs have standing to bring suit for a 
First Amendment violation pursuant to § 1983 based on the 
defendants‟ alleged retaliation against Montone as a result of 
her political activities.  See Branti, 445 U.S. at 519; Galli, 
490 F.3d at 272-73.  Thus, the second prong of the test is 
satisfied.  See Galli, 490 F.3d at 271.  Therefore, as in the 
Montone suit, only the third prong of the test – the causation 
element – is disputed.  See id.   
 
 The District Court found that the Astriab plaintiffs 
failed to meet their burden with respect to the causation 
element because they “failed to point to evidence from which 
a reasonable trier of fact could decide in their favor on the 
question of whether Montone‟s political conduct was a 
motivating factor in the decision not to promote her or them.”  
Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at *4.  We hold that when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Astriab plaintiffs, 
the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
First Amendment retaliation, and thus the District Court erred 
in granting summary judgment for the defendants.  
 
 The District Court first erred by failing to consider 
much of the evidence the plaintiffs adduced to satisfy their 
burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact.  When 
evaluating a summary judgment motion, a district court must 
consider “materials in the record, including depositions, 
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documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 
declarations, stipulations[,] . . . admissions, interrogatory 
answers, or other materials . . . .”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Yet, 
the District Court considered only two types of evidence 
presented by the Astriab plaintiffs: lieutenant Gillan‟s 
deposition testimony, which the District Court dismissed as 
“anonymous,” inadmissible hearsay,10 as well as Inspector 
Russ‟ memoranda recommending that Troy make promotions 
to lieutenant and Troy‟s testimony that he did not follow 
Russ‟ recommendations.  Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at *3. 
 
 Among the evidence not mentioned by the District 
Court in its analysis of the summary judgment motions were 
the Jersey City government agreements authorizing the 
promotion of officers to the rank of lieutenant.  The District 
Court also failed to consider personnel orders signed by Troy 
ordering promotions in every rank except lieutenant.  
Additionally, the District Court disregarded correspondence 
from O‟Reilly and Police Director Samuel Jefferson, as well 
as deposition testimony from Healy, indicating that the 
defendants expressly refused to promote any of the plaintiffs 
to lieutenant upon expiration of the 2003-2006 promotion list, 
but almost immediately after the issuance of the 2006-2009 
list, promoted twelve sergeants to lieutenant, only one of 
whom was an Astriab plaintiff.  Furthermore, the District 
Court neglected to consider Jersey City and Healy‟s answers 
to interrogatories, as well as deposition testimony by several 
                                              
10
  A full analysis as to the admissibility of Gillan‟s 
testimony is unnecessary because, as discussed below, there 
was sufficient other evidence to raise a genuine issue of 




Astriab plaintiffs, detailing conversations with Troy in which 
he explained that Montone and certain Astriab plaintiffs 
would not be promoted because of Montone‟s involvement in 




We acknowledge that evidence was also presented 
indicating that the defendants‟ failure to promote the 
plaintiffs was the result of factors other than Montone‟s 
political affiliation.  For example, Whalen testified that when 
he protested to Troy that it was “not fair” that neither 
Montone nor any other sergeant would be promoted, Troy 
responded by asking, “Well, how would you feel if your best 
friend‟s wife is sitting at the kitchen table crying over threats 
made by [Montone] against her son and nephew?”  (A.A. 
401.)  Scerbo testified that on another occasion Troy told him 
that he “should have no problem” obtaining a promotion 
because he “was in front of Valerie.”12  (A.A. 374.)  Finally, 
                                              
11
  Although the District Court rejected as inadmissible 
hearsay the deposition testimony of several of the Astriab 
plaintiffs, we hold that their testimony concerning Troy‟s 
statements is admissible as a party-opponent admission, and 
thus should have been considered in resolving the summary 
judgment motions.  See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).  
  
12
  Although Jersey City argues that “the unreliable 
statements of Whalen, DeStefano and Scerbo must be 
discounted entirely,” (Jersey City‟s A. Br. at 38), “[i]n 
considering a motion for summary judgment, [the] court may 
not make credibility determinations or engage in any 
weighing of the evidence . . . .”  Marino, 358 F.3d at 247.  




Troy testified that there was no shortage of lieutenants, and 
that the lack of promotions to lieutenant between 2004 and 
2006 was due to budgetary concerns and restructuring of the 
JCPD.   
 
Rather than counseling in favor of granting summary 
judgment for the defendants, however, the above-described 
evidence demonstrates the existence of a genuine dispute 
about material facts related to the causation element of the 
plaintiffs‟ First Amendment claim, including whether there 
was a shortage of lieutenants such that promotions were 
necessary (or not); whether Troy was authorized to make 
promotions; and the reason for the lack of promotions to 
lieutenant between 2004 and 2006.  The District Court thus 
erred in concluding that there was no triable issue of fact 
regarding the causation element of the plaintiffs‟ claim.  
 
 Finally, the District Court erroneously drew inferences 
unfavorable to the Astriab plaintiffs, the non-movants, and 
improperly assumed the role of fact-finder.  For example, the 
District Court found that Inspector Russ‟ memoranda to Troy 
recommending the promotion of officers to the rank of 
lieutenant, coupled with Troy‟s decision not to promote the 
plaintiffs, did not “constitute[] evidence from which a 
reasonable finder of fact could infer that Montone‟s political 
affiliation motivated Troy‟s decision.”  Astriab, 2011 WL 
5080353, at *3.  In so holding, the District Court reasoned 
that “[t]he most that Plaintiffs have pointed to is the temporal 
proximity of Troy‟s first act of not following . . . Russ‟ 
staffing recommendations after the November 2004 election.”  




[E]ven if a trier of fact were to 
contemplate the inference, based 
on temporal proximity, that 
Montone‟s conduct during the 
election was a substantial factor in 
Troy‟s decision not to promote 
more Lieutenants, the Russ 
memoranda constitute 
independent intervening events 
which tend to preclude finding 
any such link.  It is clear that 
Troy‟s inaction on the memoranda 
was most directly in response to 
the memoranda themselves.  
There is no evidence that the 
election played any proximate 





 The District Court‟s conclusion that “Troy‟s inaction 
on the memoranda was most directly in response to the 
memoranda themselves,” Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at *3, 
directly contradicts the undisputed fact that after receiving 
Russ‟ memoranda, which called for promotions to various 
ranks including lieutenant, Troy made promotions to all other 
ranks except lieutenant.  It also contradicts testimony by 
several Astriab plaintiffs, including Whalen, who testified 
that Troy stated that he was “not making any lieutenants” 
because Montone was not being promoted as a result of 
“hurt[ing] us” during the 2004 campaign.  (A.A. 362-63, 
387.)  As we recognized in Stephens, a plaintiff in a First 
40 
 
Amendment retaliation action may prevail on summary 
judgment “by discrediting [the defendant‟s] proffered reason 
[for the employment action], either circumstantially or 
directly, or by adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or 
direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a 
motivating or substantial cause of the adverse action.”  122 
F.3d at 181.   
 
 When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, the evidence presented in opposition to the 
summary judgment motions demonstrates that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Montone‟s 
political conduct was a motivating factor in the defendants‟ 
decision not to promote the Astriab plaintiffs.  Accordingly, 
we vacate the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to 
Jersey City and Troy on the political retaliation claim asserted 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s judgments. 
